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Avoidance is a key characteristic of adaptive and maladaptive fear. Here, we review past
and contemporary theories of avoidance learning. Based on the theories, experimental
findings and clinical observations reviewed, we distill key principles of how adaptive
and maladaptive avoidance behavior is acquired and maintained. We highlight clinical
implications of avoidance learning theories and describe intervention strategies that could
reduce maladaptive avoidance and prevent its return. We end with a brief overview of
recent developments and avenues for further research.
Keywords: avoidance, fear, anxiety, learning, neuroscience
Introduction
Avoidance of genuinely threatening stimuli or situations is a key characteristic of adaptive fear.
People will typically not enter a building after a major earthquake nor approach a stray lion. At the
same time, excessive avoidance in the absence of real threat can severely impair individuals’ quality
of life and may stop them from encountering anxiety-correcting information (Barlow, 2002). In
such cases, avoidance loses its adaptive value and may transform into a maladaptive response.
Maladaptive avoidance is in fact a central characteristic of a wide spectrum of mental disorders
(World Health Organization, 2004; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Individuals with
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), for instance, tend to avoid situations in which the potential
for contact with contaminants is high (Rachman, 2004), Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
patients will try to avoid intrusive memories (Brewin and Holmes, 2003; Williams and Moulds,
2007), and social phobics will refuse to attend group gatherings (Bögels et al., 2010; Schneier et al.,
2011).
Given the key role of avoidance in normal and disordered psychological functioning, it is
critical to better understand the relevant conditions and psychological mechanisms responsible
for the learning of avoidant reactions. Alas, although avoidance learning was once a central topic
in basic psychological research, interest has waned since the 1970’s, leaving important questions
unanswered. Only recently has there been a resurgence of theoretical, experimental and clinical
interest in the study of avoidance (see Figure 1). In the last years, new psychological theories
of avoidance learning have been proposed (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2005; Lovibond, 2006) and
avoidance is quickly becoming a topic of prime empirical interest not only in experimental
psychology but also in clinical psychology and psychiatry as well as in behavioral neuroscience
(see the present special issue). The latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) includes avoidance in
several diagnostic criteria that previously referred to fear only. In parallel, recent years have
brought rapid increases in our understanding of the brain processes involved in the learning
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FIGURE 1 | Number of publications indexed in Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science, research area psychology, that have the word “avoidance” in their
title, by year, 1955–2014 (as of May 12, 2015).
(e.g., Delgado et al., 2009), expression (e.g., Cominski et al., 2014),
and reduction (e.g., McCue et al., 2014) of avoidance behavior.
In this paper we review the main historical and modern
theories of avoidance learning and present a set of principles of
avoidance learning that integrate those theoretical propositions
with the strongest experimental support. We also address the
clinical implications of those principles and relate them to
current and novel interventions for maladaptive avoidance such
as in anxiety disorders or PTSD. Lastly, we consider recent
findings from behavioral neuroscience.
The outline of the paper is as follows: We first describe
how avoidance learning is studied in laboratory settings and
how functionally similar behaviors can serve the avoidance
of or the escape from an aversive event. Next, we discuss
traditional theories of avoidance learning, including Mowrer’s
two-factor theory. In the third section we describe Bolles’ (1970,
1971) Species-Specific Defense Reactions (SSDR) theory. We
then review more recent theories of avoidance learning that
address informational factors (e.g., expectancies) in avoidance.
Next, we propose a set of principles for avoidance learning
that incorporates the most well-validated propositions of the
aforementioned theories. We end our review with suggestions
for closer alignment between basic and clinical science and a few
avenues for future research.
Laboratory Procedures for Studying
Avoidance Learning
Avoidance learning procedures typically entail the cancelation of
an impending aversive event by either the emission or inhibition
of an experimenter-designated response. In active avoidance
procedures, for example, an antecedent stimulus is followed by
an aversive event unless an experimenter-designated response is
executed, a response that typically also terminates the antecedent
stimulus. For example, dogs will learn to jump a barrier following
the presentation of a light, previously associated with shock
administration (Solomon and Wynne, 1953).
By contrast, in passive avoidance procedures, the aversive event
occurs only if an experimenter-designated response is executed
during the antecedent stimulus presentation. For example, in a
standard passive avoidance procedure for rats, a rat is placed
in a brightly lit compartment of a two-compartment box, with
the second compartment being dark and the two compartments
separated by a closed door (Venable and Kelly, 1990; Kaminsky
et al., 2001). Given that rats have a preference for dark compared
to lit environments (see Costall et al., 1989; Bourin and Hascoët,
2003), they will move to the dark compartment once the door is
opened, an action that will be followed by shock administration.
This procedure often results in the rats passively avoiding
the shock by remaining in the light compartment on future
occasions.
In avoidance procedures, the experimenter-designated
response is not necessarily performed prior to the aversive
outcome, but can also be performed in presence of it. In such
cases, it would be more accurate to categorize the performed
response as escape rather than avoidance. Escape responses
involve distancing oneself from an ongoing aversive event
while avoidance refers to behavior that causes the omission of
a forthcoming noxious outcome, predicted by an antecedent
stimulus (Bowrer and Hilgard, 1981; see also the distinction
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between antecedent events and aversive outcomes in Lovibond
and Rapee, 1993). Thus, what differentiates avoidance from
escape is the proximity of threat (imminent vs. ongoing).
An elegant animal laboratory procedure to differentiate
between avoidance and escape responses, especially relevant
to behavioral neuroscience, is the elevated T-maze task (ETM;
Pellow et al., 1985). The ETM has been primarily designed for
testing rats’ defensive reactions in innately fearful environments
(i.e., open spaces and heights; Montgomery, 1955). It typically
consists of three elevated arms with one arm surrounded by a
wall (enclosed arm) and the other two being open (open arms).
Initially, the rat is placed in the enclosed arm.While exploring the
rat will eventually end up in the open arms. Following repeated
trials, the rat will tend to remain longer in the enclosed arms
after being placed there (i.e., passive avoidance) or run toward
the enclosed arm after being placed in one of the open arms (i.e.,
escape).
By using this procedure, research has illuminated the
differences in the neurobiology of avoidance and escape.
Specifically, serotonin, an anxiogenic neurotransmitter relevant
for defensive responses (Graeff, 2002), seems to play a different
role in the two types of behaviors (Zangrossi et al., 2001), with
serotonin administration enhancing avoidance and inhibiting
escape (Graeff, 1991). That observation supports the argument
that avoidance and escape may constitute diverse types of
defensive behaviors, differently elicited as a function of the
proximity of threat (imminent or ongoing), a hypothesis also
in line with models associating defensive response selection to
predatory imminence (Fanselow, 1994). Of note, the difference
between escape and avoidance is also relevant for clinical
practice. Specifically, Deakin and Graeff (1991) suggested
that (passive) avoidance is mainly related to generalized
anxiety disorder (GAD), where a threatening event is typically
anticipated, and escape to panic disorder, where panic reactions
could be considered as responses to an ongoing perceived danger
(Shuhama et al., 2007). This suggestion has gathered partial
support from pharmacological studies. It has been demonstrated
that commonly prescribed anxiolytic drugs (e.g., diazepam)
result in passive avoidance deficiencies while leaving escape
behavior intact. On the contrary, cholecystokinin agonists,
which typically invoke panic attacks, facilitate escape behaviors
(Pinheiro et al., 2007; Graeff and Zangrossi, 2010). Taken
together, avoidance and escape seem to be distinct subtypes of
defensive behaviors, and that they might play a different role in
mental disorders.
Active and passive avoidance and escape procedures have
proved valuable for testing avoidance and/or escape learning
in laboratory settings. Based on findings obtained with those
procedures, theories have emerged that address the underlying
psychological mechanisms. We now turn to a discussion of early
theories of avoidance/escape learning in psychology.
Early Theories of Avoidance/Escape
Learning and the Two-factor Theory
In the early days of psychology, learned avoidance was considered
an example of a Pavlovian conditioned reflex (Bekhterev,
1907, 1913; Watson, 1916). Just like Pavlov’s dogs would
salivate upon the sound of a metronome previously associated
with food administration (Pavlov, 1927), in the studies of
Bekhterev (1913), a dog would flex its leg after the presentation
of an antecedent stimulus, previously associated with shock
administration (Herrnstein, 1969; Bolles, 1972). Since leg flexion
would occur in the presence of the antecedent stimulus and prior
to shock delivery, the acquired response was considered to reflect
Pavlovian learning.
Nonetheless, two procedural characteristics differentiated
the acquired responses from learned Pavlovian reflexes. First,
what constituted the avoidance response (e.g., leg flexion) was
usually an experimenter-defined voluntary response, whereas
in Pavlov’s experiment the learned response toward an initially
neutral stimulus (i.e., salivation upon sound of the metronome)
would typically consist of the automatic response toward an
evolutionary relevant stimulus (i.e., salivation during food
presentation; Unconditioned Stimulus or US). Second, the
emitted response would lead to the cancelation of the impending
event, making the (non-)presentation of the aversive stimulus
dependent on the organism’s response (Herrnstein, 1969). This
procedural aspect is at odds with the standard Pavlovian
procedure in which the presentation of food, or of any other
US, would not depend on the animal’s response (i.e., food would
be presented independently of whether dogs salivated or not).
Those procedural differences pointed to the potential operation
of instrumental processes during avoidance learning, since
in instrumental learning procedures an experimenter-defined
action of the organism is necessary for outcome presentation
or omission (Rescorla and Solomon, 1967). The potential
involvement of instrumental processes, however, raised the
question as to how avoidance responses are reinforced. Although
one might intuitively argue that the source of reinforcement is
the omission of the impending aversive event (i.e., the dogs flex
their legs because this cancels the shock), assigning the cause
of behavior to an event that has not yet occurred (i.e., shock
administration) violated the dominant scientific principles of
psychology at the time (i.e., the behaviorist paradigm; Watson,
1913).
A solution to that conundrum was offered in the two-factor
theory formulated by Orval (Mowrer, 1951), who proposed that
the performed response was reinforced by fear reduction (Hull,
1943). Specifically, Mowrer argued that as a result of Pavlovian
fear conditioning (first factor), i.e., an antecedent stimulus (e.g.,
a tone) being associated with the administration of an aversive
event (e.g., a shock), presentation of the antecedent stimulus
will come to evoke fear. Subsequently, during the instrumental
phase (second factor), escape responses that are emitted in the
presence of the antecedent stimulus will be negatively reinforced
by fear reduction, due to increased distance to or cessation of
the antecedent stimulus. This idea was heavily inspired by the
avoidance learning procedures used at the time, where avoidance
responses led to the termination of the antecedent stimulus by
locomotion (e.g., moving away from a shock area of a box) or
by the antecedent stimulus being turned off. Of note, according
to Mowrer, the omission of the aversive outcome event was to
be regarded as a mere by-product of the performed CS escape
behavior (Schöenfeld, 1950; Mowrer, 1960).
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Two-factor theory quickly gained popularity in experimental
psychology. By resorting to the concept of fear reduction during
the instrumental phase, Mowrer’s proposition was in line with
the dominant drive reduction theories of the time (e.g., the drive
reduction theory of Hull, 1943). Concurrently, by suggesting
that the initial fear learning was based on Pavlovian processes,
rather than drive reduction, the theory was better applicable
to experimental data than the competing theory of Neal Miller
(Miller, 1948), according to which all reinforcement during
escape/avoidance learning originated from fear reduction.
Mowrer’s theory has been used not only for explaining how
maladaptive avoidance is acquired (Levis, 1981), but also as a
basis for clinical interventions (Eysenck and Rachman, 1965). For
example, in exposure therapy a patient is repeatedly confronted
with a fearful situation or stimulus, in order to reduce that fear.
It is commonly suggested that patients should be kept in the
exposure situation until fear or anxiety levels have declined. This
suggestion is rooted in two-factor theory and the notion that if
the exposure session is terminated while fear levels remain high,
the fear reduction caused by the termination of the session could
promote escape or avoidance of similar situations in the future
(Mathews et al., 1981; Emmelkamp, 1982; see next section for
arguments against this notion).
Despite its wide influence on basic research and clinical
science, two-factor theory had trouble explaining later data (see
Rescorla and Solomon, 1967; Herrnstein, 1969; McAllister and
McAllister, 1991, for extended discussions of two-factor theory).
We now turn to some of the key criticisms against the two-factor
theory.
Criticisms Against the Two-factor Theory
One of the strongest criticisms against the two-factor theory
concerned the purported role of fear in motivating the emission
of a learned escape/avoidance response. According to Mowrer’s
proposition, escape/avoidance is motivated by high fear levels.
This notion implies that no such actions should be performed
in the absence of fear. One of the first experiments to show
that this may not be true was done by Solomon et al. (1953).
In their experiment, dogs were first trained to jump across a
barrier in response to the sounding of a buzzer previously paired
with shock. The dogs then received a fear extinction treatment in
which the buzzer was repeatedly presented without shock. Such
extinction procedure typically leads to the reduction of fear levels
(Hermans et al., 2006). If, as assumed by Mowrer, it is fear that
motivates escape/avoidance, it would be expected that following
Pavlovian fear extinction, dogs would also stop performing the
avoidance response. The results contradicted this hypothesis:
Dogs continued to jump upon sounding of the buzzer, even when
the shock device had long been turned off permanently.
The observation that fear may not be necessary for avoidance
has clear clinical implications. As mentioned earlier, patients are
typically prevented from prematurely terminating exposure out
of concern that the fear reduction resulting from termination
of the session could otherwise serve as negative reinforcement
for escape (Eysenck and Rachman, 1965). Experimental data,
however, indicate that patients undergoing exposure therapy
show similar clinical improvement regardless of whether they
ended exposure while fear levels were high or low (De Silva
and Rachman, 1984; Rachman et al., 1986). Taken together, both
experimental data and clinical findings suggest that fear may
sometimes, but not always, be involved in the maintenance of
avoidance, and as such, fear and avoidance may not always
“synchronize” with each other (Rachman and Hodgson, 1974).
Two-factor theory also had trouble explaining how avoidance
can be acquired in the absence of an explicit antecedent stimulus.
Specifically, in unsignaled avoidance procedures (Sidman, 1953a,
1962; see Lázaro-Muñoz et al., 2010; McCue et al., 2014 for more
recent examples), rats learn to avoid shocks presented at fixed
time intervals, in the absence of a discrete antecedent stimulus
(Sidman, 1953a,b; see Hassoulas et al., 2013, for examples in
humans). In its initial form, two-factor theory assumed the
operation of explicit antecedent stimuli during the Pavlovian
and the instrumental phases, stimuli that during unsignaled
procedures appear to be absent.
A potential explanation for the observation of unsignaled
avoidance procedures is that although not explicit, warning
stimuli may still be present in a “silent” form. Temporal and
proprioceptive stimuli (e.g., the passage of time), for example,
could be associated with the aversive outcome (Schöenfeld, 1950;
Dinsmoor, 1977). Subsequently, those stimuli could signal the
presentation of an aversive event (for an alternative account
centering on the role of US omission during avoidance learning
see Herrnstein, 1969).
By assuming that avoidance is based on reinforcement
learning, the two-factor theory also failed to explain how
avoidance is acquired in naturalistic settings, where the first
encounter of an organism with danger could prove fatal (Bolles,
1970; Osada et al., 2014). Similarly, when it comes to maladaptive
avoidance, patients do not always report a direct traumatic event
as the source of their symptomatology (Rachman, 1990). An
explanation for those observations is that avoidance need not
always be acquired through direct experience but can be acquired
via other pathways as well (Rachman, 1991, 1977; Olsson and
Phelps, 2004, 2007). Those pathways include vicarious learning
(e.g., learning to be afraid of dogs after observing someone being
afraid of a dog) and instructional learning (e.g., learning to be
afraid of a dog after someone suggesting that dogs often attack
people; Bandura and Rosenthal, 1966; Rachman, 1977). Recent
evidence shows that avoidance learning can be achieved even
more indirectly, such as through symbolic generalization. One
demonstration of that was presented by Augustson and Dougher
(1997). They first trained individuals to categorize eight different
stimuli (i.e., A1, B1, C1, D1, A2, B2, C2, and D2) into two
arbitrary categories (i.e., 1 and 2), using standard conditional
discrimination procedures (Sidman, 1987): Participants first saw
a target stimulus (e.g., A1) and were then asked to choose one
from three stimuli presented on screen. One of those stimuli
was arbitrarily assigned to the same category (e.g., B1), one
stimulus to the other category (e.g., C2) and another one was
irrelevant (e.g., X). Participants’ task was to learn to choose
the stimulus from the same category as the target stimulus
(e.g., B1). In case of a correct response, the word “correct” was
presented and in case of an incorrect response, the word “wrong”
was presented. For example, when stimulus A1 was presented,
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selecting the stimulus that belonged to the same category (e.g.,
B1, C1 or D1) was positively reinforced whereas the selection of
any other stimulus (e.g., B2 or X) was punished. Such a procedure
typically results in people learning that the stimuli within
each category are functionally equivalent. During a subsequent
fear conditioning phase, B1 was paired with shock and B2
with the absence of shock. An instrumental phase followed,
where participants could avoid shocks with a button press.
Critically, results showed that, in addition to performing more
avoidance responses in the presence of B1 than B2, participants
also performed more avoidance responses to (unreinforced)
presentations of C1 and D1 (the stimuli arbitrarily related to
B1) than in the presence of C2 and D2 (the stimuli related
to B2). Apparently, avoidance responses to B1 symbolically
generalized to C1 and D1, which had been previously trained as
equivalent to B1, without an avoidance schedule being trained
for those stimuli. Those findings have recently been replicated
and extended (Dymond and Roche, 2009; Dymond et al., 2011).
Taken together, direct traumatic experiences may not always
be necessary for the acquisition of avoidance, a proposition
that is in line with contemporary views on fear learning and
psychopathology (Mineka and Zinbarg, 2006).
Another argument against the two-factor theory regards
the extent to which Pavlovian and instrumental learning are
both necessary for the acquisition of avoidance. As a result of
Pavlovian fear conditioning, a previously neutral cue will come
to evoke various fear responses (e.g., enhanced physiological
arousal; Beckers et al., 2013). According to emotion theories,
action tendencies are an essential component of emotions (Lang,
1985; Frijda, 1988). As such, “to fear is to want to avoid.”
Therefore, it could be assumed that the tendency to avoid a
stimulus or situation may be acquired via purely Pavlovian
learning, without instrumental reinforcement. We have recently
tested this assumption. Following a differential fear conditioning
procedure, during which pictures of one geometrical object
were always followed by shock (CS+) whereas pictures of
another object were never followed by shock (CS−), participants
were faster to avoid the CS+ and approach the CS− than
vice versa in a symbolic approach-avoidance reaction time
task (AAT; Krypotos et al., 2014b). Crucially, shock electrodes
were detached from participants’ hands during the AAT, and
responses had no influence on the duration or presence of the
CS, eliminating any instrumental basis for avoidance. Those
results suggest that avoidance tendencies can be acquired via
mere Pavlovian associations, in the absence of instrumental
learning. Such acquisition of motor responses toward a CS in
absence of instrumental learning has long been established in
the appetitive domain. In auto-shaping procedures (Brown and
Jenkins, 1968), for example, pairings of a visual CS with food
would typically result in the animal (e.g., a rat or a pigeon)
producing consumption responses toward the CS (e.g., licking
or pecking, respectively), despite those responses being irrelevant
for food presentation.
Lastly, recent findings suggest that avoidance can be evoked
by the identification of predator related stimuli (e.g., smells)
even in absence of a previous encounter with the predator.
Specifically, mice (Osada et al., 2013) and deer (Osada et al., 2014)
tend to avoid (or emit other defense-like behaviors) areas where
the active components of predators’ urine odors are presented,
without any previous experience with that specific predator. An
explanation for those findings is that such avoidance may be the
result of “evolutionary memory” (Provenza, 1995) and as such,
avoiding such stimuli (e.g., odors or blood) does not require the
learning of associations between a stimulus (i.e., smell) and the
aversive event. Of note, similar effects are yet to be demonstrated
in humans.
To sum up, although influential, the two-factor theory of
Mowrer proves unable to account for a series of experimental
results and clinical observations. In response to those
shortcomings of the two-factor theory, alternative theories
have been proposed. One of those, with major influence in the
experimental field, is the SSDR theory of Bolles (1970, 1971).
Species-specific Defense Reactions
It has long been demonstrated that in Pavlovian conditioning,
evolutionary relevant stimuli (e.g., spiders) are more readily
associated with an aversive event (e.g., shock) than non-
evolutionary relevant stimuli (e.g., flowers; Öhman and Mineka,
2001). Similarly, in the area of taste aversion, associations
between tastes and induced sickness are acquired more readily
than between audio-visual cues and sickness whereas audio-
visual cues are associated more readily with shock than tastes are
(the Garcia effect; Garcia et al., 1955; Davis and Riley, 2010).
An explanation for those findings is that by being wired to
preferentially associative aversive events (i.e., shock and sickness)
with phylogenetically relevant stimuli (i.e., spiders and tastes), an
organism is better prepared to learn about likely cues for danger.
Such ability would equip the organism with an evolutionary
advantage for surviving potentially harmful cues or situations.
An interesting question is whether individuals are similarly
predisposed to associate the cancelation or termination of an
aversive event with particular behavioral responses.
This seems to be the case. Rats will learn much more
rapidly to avoid an aversive outcome by running—a behavior
commonly used for avoiding a predator—than by moving their
tail (Maatsch, 1959; Meyer et al., 1960; Theios et al., 1966;
Masterson, 1970). Observations such as those inspired Bolles
in his formulation of the Species-Specific Defense Reactions
(SSDRs) theory. According to this theory, under a state of fear,
organisms are phylogenetically predisposed to emit specific types
of responses (e.g., fleeing, freezing, or fighting) rather than others.
Bolles went one step further to suggest that for such responses,
reinforcement learning is actually unnecessary; the organism just
needs to learn that a stimulus predicts an aversive outcome for it
to elicit an SSDR (Bolles, 1970, 1971).
The SSDR theory could indeed explain the fast acquisition of
specific avoidance responses that served the evolutionary survival
of the organism. Nonetheless, sometimes, an avoidance response
has to be acquired that does not belong to an organism’s SSDR
repertoire (Crawford and Masterson, 1982). Rats, for example,
can learn to avoid an aversive outcome by rearing on a wheel, a
response that arguably does not usually serve survival purposes,
although at a much slower rate than learning to avoid that same
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 July 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 189
Krypotos et al. Avoidance learning
outcome by running on the wheel (Bolles and Grossen, 1969).
In those cases, it is suggested that although under a state of fear
SSDRs will initially be performed, those SSDRs will be punished
by the occurrence of the aversive event, allowing for non-SSDRs
to subsequently emerge. In other words, non-SSDRs would not
(or not merely) be negatively reinforced, as Mowrer suggested,
but they would arise because of SSDRs being positively punished
by the presentation of the aversive event.
To sum up, Bolles provided a theory that could explain
why some avoidance responses are acquired more readily than
others, and why reinforcement may often be unnecessary for the
acquisition of avoidance. Nonetheless, the theory has limitations.
For one, fear states are on a continuum, ranging from low
to high levels, making it difficult to define at which specific
level the restriction of the behavioral repertoire to SSDRs
occurs (Masterson and Crawford, 1982). Also, by rejecting
reinforcement as a source for SSDRs, Bolles’ theory makes it hard
to explain findings suggesting that bar pressing is acquired faster
when it leads to access to a safe place than when it merely leads
to US omission (Crawford and Masterson, 1978). Thus, although
SDDR theory provided answers to important avoidance learning
questions, it fails to accurately define the conditions under which
avoidance learning will occur and to provide a comprehensive
account for all instances of avoidance acquisition.
Informational Factors in Avoidance
Learning
The theories we have discussed so far provided functional
explanations of avoidance learning, denying any role for
cognitive or informational factors in the interpretation of
avoidance acquisition. As such, those theories were in harmony
with the dominant functional accounts of learning of the
behaviorist paradigm. However, those functional accounts of
learning failed to explain a series of laboratory phenomena such
as that of blocking (i.e., impaired CS1-US acquisition if CS1 is
paired with the US in compound with a CS2 that has been
previously paired with the US in itself; Kamin, 1956, 1967, 1969)
and conditioned inhibition (i.e., learned inhibitory responses
toward CS1 if a CS1–CS2 compound is repeatedly presented
without the US while CS2 is paired with the US when presented
in itself; Rescorla, 1969). Such phenomena challenged traditional
associative theories according to which CS-US contiguity is
sufficient for Pavlovian acquisition (Rescorla, 1972; Miller et al.,
1995).
As a result, a general shift in theories of learning has
been observed, such that informational factors (e.g., outcome
expectancies or stimulus surprisingness) started to be considered
as potential explanations of acquired behavior (Rescorla, 1972).
One theory of learning with a lasting influence that was
developed in that period, is the Rescorla-Wagner model (RWM;
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Wagner and Rescorla, 1972). The
basic premise of the RWM is that the rate of conditioning
to a CS depends on whether the ensuing presentation of the
US is surprising or not. If the CS did not elicit an accurate
prediction of the (non-)occurrence of the US (negative or positive
prediction error), learning about the CS occurs; if it did, no
learning occurs. This model clearly deviates from earlier theories
of learning in that it recognizes the role of informational factors
(i.e., predictions) in conditioning, and despite justified criticisms
(Miller et al., 1995), it is a model with great heuristic and
predictive value (Beckers and Vervliet, 2009).
In the next section we present avoidance learning models
that, like the RWM for Pavlovian learning, rely on informational
factors to account for avoidance learning.
The Role of Safety Signals
In our examples of Pavlovian fear conditioning, we have so
far discussed situations in which an antecedent stimulus signals
an aversive event. It might be assumed that in such situations,
knowledge is acquired about the relation between the antecedent
stimulus and the aversive event only. However, if there are also
signals present that predict the absence of an otherwise expected
aversive event (i.e., safety signals), those will be learned about as
well, and fear responses will be inhibited in the presence of those
stimuli (conditioned inhibition, see above).
A relevant question then is whether, in addition to reducing
fear levels, safety signals might also be able to inhibit avoidance
behavior. This hypothesis was tested in a seminal study of
Rescorla and LoLordo (1965), who showed that dogs would
learn to jump a small barrier after the presentation of a tone
previously associated with shock but would withhold avoidance
upon the presentation of another tone previously associated
with the absence of shock (see Weisman and Litner, 1969, for
a replication). Those findings indicate that during avoidance
learning, knowledge is acquired not only about stimuli that signal
an aversive event, so that those stimuli come to elicit defensive
behaviors (e.g., avoidance, escape), but also about stimuli that
signal the absence of a forthcoming aversive event, with the latter
stimuli inhibiting defensive behaviors.
Assigning a role to safety stimuli in avoidance learning allows
to explain a series of data that previous theories could not
account for. For example, it has been shown that avoidance
can be acquired readily even if the CS is not terminated
upon the performance of the experimenter-designated avoidance
response (Soltysik et al., 1983; Avcu et al., 2014). This
observation contradicts two-factor theory, according to which
the termination of the antecedent event is necessary for fear
reduction. A safety signal account can explain those data, by
assuming that changes in contextual or internal cues upon
performance of the experimenter-designated response can serve
as safety signals. The reinforcing value of safety cues can also
explain why avoidance is acquired faster if the avoidance response
leads to a safe environment than if it does not (Crawford and
Masterson, 1978; see also Morris, 1975; Kim et al., 2006, for
related evidence).
Another observation partially supportive of a safety signal
account is that rats prefer a box compartment in which a
light is presented before the administration of an (unavoidable)
shock, over a compartment in which shocks occur unannounced
(Lockard, 1963). According to a safety signal account, the
predictability of the aversive event makes the situation less
unpleasant because the absence of the warning stimulus signals
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that the situation is safe (Seligman, 1968; Seligman et al., 1971), a
view also in line with the RWM approach to inhibitory learning.
The safety signal account can also help to explain why
exposure therapy does not necessarily lead to a reduction
of avoidance. Specifically, it has been suggested that while
undergoing exposure therapy, patients will try to reduce their
unpleasantly high fear levels by engaging in overt or covert
safety behaviors that reduce those fear levels (“within situation
safety”; Wells et al., 1996; Salkovskis et al., 1999). Such safety
behaviors may involve the generation of safety signals to reduce
fear levels. For instance, individuals who are afraid to experience
a panic attack while flying, might endure traveling in an airplane
as long as they can carry anxiolytics with them. Having such
medication in their pocket can serve as a signal that they can
avoid a potential panic attack. No matter how helpful such
strategy is in reducing momentary fear levels, the engagement
in safety behaviors typically preserves the dysfunctional belief
that the situation is inherently dangerous. By implication, on
future occasions where they cannot engage their customary safety
behaviors, individuals may revert into avoidance behavior in
those situations.
The Cognitive Theory of Seligman and Johnson
One of the most influential theories of avoidance learning, which
explicitly addressed the role of informational factors, is the
cognitive theory of Seligman and Johnston (1973).
In spite of its name, the theory actually contains both
a cognitive and an emotional component. The cognitive
component revolves around the assumption that human and
non-human animals would prefer not receiving an aversive
stimulus over receiving one. The cognitive component also
contains the notion that as a result of an avoidance learning
schedule, humans or animals would learn to expect an aversive
stimulus if an avoidance response is not performed and not
to expect an aversive stimulus if an avoidance response is
performed. The emotional component mainly refers to the
Pavlovian fear responses that develop during an avoidance
learning procedure as previously described by Mowrer and
others.
By incorporating a role for expectancies in avoidance learning
and maintenance, the cognitive model could account for data
not easily explained by two-factor theory. For example, in the
experiment of Solomon et al. (1953) mentioned previously,
dogs would keep jumping a barrier subsequent to a buzzer
presentation previously associated with shock, even when the
experimenter stopped shock administration. Since shocks no
longer followed buzzer presentation, it would be expected that
fear would extinguish (see Pavlovian extinction). According to
two-factor theory, fear motivates escape/avoidance responses,
and since fear was assumed to have extinguished, it should be
expected that avoidance would diminish as well, a hypothesis that
was at odds with the data. Those data, however, can be explained
by the cognitive theory. According to it, avoidance is maintained
despite the potential reduction in fear levels because by jumping
the barrier, the animal does not directly experience that the
antecedent stimulus is not followed by the aversive outcome. As
such, the expectancy that an aversive event would occur after the
presentation of the antecedent stimulus if an avoidance response
were not emitted, is preserved.
Disconfirmation of expectancies, on the other hand, could
explain why avoidance diminishes when exposure is combined
with response prevention (Baum, 1966, 1970). During such
schedule, individuals encounter a phobic stimulus while the
execution of all escape responses is blocked. As a result,
avoidance responses are typically thwarted when the individual
encounters the antecedent stimulus in the future. This reduction
in avoidance response execution, not achieved by traditional
exposure programs, can be explained by considering that by not
executing the escape response during the antecedent stimulus
presentation, patients can realize that the expected noxious
event was not to occur anyway. This then, removes the need to
execute any defensive reaction during future encounters with the
antecedent stimulus.
The cognitive model is not without limitations, some of which
Seligman and Johnson noted themselves (Seligman and Johnston,
1973, pp. 100–101). One limitation is that the theory implicitly
treats all types of avoidance responses as equivalent. Research on
SSDRs suggests that this notion is untenable. Also, as noted by
Lovibond (2006), the model remains silent as to how fear and
expectancies relate to each other1. As a result, it cannot explain
experimental observations such as the return of extinguished fear
when the performance of the avoidance response is prevented
(Solomon et al., 1953).
Negative Occasion Setter Account
Informational factors also play an important role in the avoidance
learning theory of De Houwer and colleagues (De Houwer
et al., 2005; Declercq and De Houwer, 2008). According to
those authors, an avoidance response serves as a signal that a
CS is not going to be followed by an aversive event, which in
associative learning language is called a “negative occasion setter”
(see Holland, 1992; Schmajuk and Holland, 1998, for reviews on
occasion setting).
Functionally, in negative occasion setting experiments, an
antecedent stimulus (e.g., a sound; CS) is followed by an outcome
(e.g., a shock; US) unless another stimulus X is presented (the
occasion setter, OS; e.g., a light). Accordingly, the antecedent
stimulus is going to be followed by an outcome only when the
occasion setter is absent and vice versa. Stimulus X thus helps to
disambiguate the relationship between the antecedent stimulus
and the forthcoming outcome.
Negative occasion setting can be translated to clinical
situations. It could be argued, for example, that the engagement
in safety behaviors, such as avoidance, serves as a signal that
a specific phobic stimulus or dreaded situation is not going to
result an aversive event. Going back to our earlier example, the
administration of an anxiolytic pill could signal that being in
an airplane is not going to be accompanied by a panic attack.
Such a proposition is different from the safety signal account.
According to this latter account, a specific stimulus is supposed
1Notably, and in contrast to more recent models of avoidance learning (e.g., the
expectancy model; Lovibond, 2006), Seligman and Johnston (1973) did not assign
a mediating role to expectancies for Pavlovian learning, although they did not fully
exclude such possibility either (see footnote 14 in Seligman and Johnston, 1973).
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to predict the absence of an aversive event directly. According to
the negative occasion setter account, however, the presence of a
specific event (e.g., avoidance) predicts that the otherwise valid
relation between a threatening stimulus and an aversive event
does not hold.
De Houwer and Declercq tested whether an avoidance
response functions as a negative occasion setter by comparing
the properties of avoidance behavior to properties of negative
occasion setters identified in the Pavlovian literature (Holland,
1992; Schmajuk and Holland, 1998). Those properties are (a)
modulation (i.e., CRs toward the CS are stronger in the absence
than in the presence of the OS), (b) resistance to counter
conditioning (i.e., CRs toward the CS are attenuated by the
OS even if the OS has been paired with the US itself), and
(c) selective transfer (i.e., the OS will modulate responding to
other CSs that have be subject to modulation before; Holland,
1992). The experiment of De Houwer et al. (2005) was at
follows.
In the first phase of their experiment, stimuli A and B were
always followed by a US (shock) whereas a third stimulus C was
followed by a US 50% of the times. In the second phase, the US
could be prevented by pressing key X when the A stimulus was
present and by pressing key Y when the B stimulus was present.
The third phase consisted of the presentation of all the events
occurring in the previous phases, in addition to trials in which
the US occurred upon pressing the X key (X-US trials). In the
crucial test phase, individuals were presented with all possible
stimulus combinations, without the US ever occurring, and they
were asked to rate their expectancy of a US.
Results from the test phase confirmed that avoidance
responses exhibit the properties of negative occasion setters.
First, participants reported higher US expectancies when the
avoidance response was not available (i.e., A and B test trials)
than when it was (i.e., AX and BY trials; modulation). This
result shows that the function of the antecedent stimulus as a
predictor of a negative outcome is dependent on the availability
of the avoidance response, a finding at odds with two-factor
theory but in line with other theories, such as Seligman and
Johnson’s cognitive model. Second, modulation was not affected
by trials in which avoidance responses were followed by the US
(i.e., the X-US trials; resistance to counterconditioning). This
finding is in partial contrast with both the safety signal hypothesis
and the cognitive model, given that the avoidance response has
now become a predictor of the aversive event rather than of
its omission. Third, participants would generalize this trained
modulation to new stimuli, particularly those stimuli that had
been involved in avoidance training (i.e., higher modulation for
the AY and BX trials than for the CX or CY trials; selective
transfer). Other models cannot easily account for this selectivity
in trained modulation.
Despite subsequent replication and extension of those findings
(Declercq and De Houwer, 2008), more recent evidence (e.g.,
Declercq and De Houwer, 2011) argues against the negative
occasion setting account, as the property of selective transfer
could also be explained by the lesser reinforcement of C
compared to A and B during the first phase of the experiment.
Still, despite this limitation, insights from the negative occasion
setting account could prove clinically important. Current
therapeutic techniques mainly target the relation between the
avoidance response and the omission of an unpleasant event.
The negative occasion setting account assumes that there is a
hierarchical structure in avoidance learning, with the avoidance
response disambiguating the relation between the antecedent
stimulus and the omission, or presentation, of the aversive event
(see Declercq and De Houwer, 2009, for relevant evidence).
If that is the case, interventions should perhaps focus more
on challenging patients’ beliefs about whether their avoidance
response leads to the omission of an otherwise to-be-expected
noxious outcome in the presence of some antecedent stimulus,
rather than on their beliefs as to whether the antecedent stimulus
is a reliable predictor of the noxious event (Declercq and
De Houwer, 2009).
Lovibond’s Expectancy Model
The most recent avoidance learning theory to include
informational factors is the expectancy model of Lovibond
(2006), which is basically an extension of the cognitive model of
Seligman and Johnston (1973).
The expectancy model agrees with the idea that avoidance
is acquired by a combination of Pavlovian and instrumental
learning processes. It also accepts Seligman and Johnson’s notion
that during the instrumental phase, knowledge is acquired about
the effects of avoidance (e.g., the omission of an expected
unpleasant event) as well as non-avoidance (i.e., the presentation
of an expected unpleasant event). Lastly, it aligns with the safety
signal account in that it accepts that during the presentation
of safety stimuli avoidance behavior is inhibited. However, the
expectancy model rejects the notion that safety signals serve as
positive reinforcers of the emitted response.
A major deviation of the expectancy model from the
aforementioned theories is the assumption that both Pavlovian
and instrumental learning are based on propositional knowledge.
According to the propositional learning account, all learning
reflects higher-order, reason-based processes, whereas earlier
associative learning theories, explicitly or implicitly, rely on
automatic association formation as the mechanism of learning.
As such, the expectancy model assumes that avoidance learning
is achieved by the accumulation of explicit knowledge about
all the stimulus contingencies (e.g., that a CS is followed by a
US during a Pavlovian phase) involved in avoidance learning
protocols. In the same vein, the expectancy account assumes that
expectancies play a crucial role not only in instrumental learning
(as hypothesized by Seligman and Johnson) but in Pavlovian
conditioning as well.
Most of the data we have presented so far can be
accommodated by the expectancy model. Similarly to the
model of Seligman and Johnston (1973), it can explain how
avoidance is acquired, how it can bemaintained despite Pavlovian
extinction, and why response prevention during extinction will
reduce avoidance. In addition, by reserving a central role for
expectancies in Pavlovian learning, the expectancy model can
better account for the relation between fear and avoidance. The
expectancy model can explain, for example, why fear returns
during response prevention, because in the absence of the
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avoidance response the aversive event is to be expected, and
outcome expectancy is what generates fear.
Lastly, although not explicitly mentioned by Lovibond (2006),
the fact that avoidance relies on propositional knowledge
also allows for the acquisition of avoidance via pathways
other than direct experience, rendering the account able to
accommodate observations of avoidance acquired through
observation, instruction, and symbolic generalization (see
above).
In summary, Lovibond’s expectancy model is a hybrid of
earlier theories that accounts for the majority of experimental
findings. Still, the model does not readily explain why some
avoidance responses are learned more readily than other. It also
cannot account for data in which escape/avoidance responses
are acquired and expressed in the absence of instrumental
reinforcement (Krypotos et al., 2014b). Lastly, it is debatable
whether all elements of the expectancy model, and specifically
the notion that propositional knowledge is a prerequisite for
learning, could be generalized to non-human animals (Castro
and Wasserman, 2009; but see Beckers et al., 2006).
Principles of Avoidance Learning
We have reviewed early and more recent theories of avoidance
learning, describing the strengths and limitations of each
theoretical account. In this section we synthesize the strongest
points of each theoretical account, distilling a set of principles of
avoidance learning that collectively can account for the majority
of existing data. We then consider recent experimental findings
on the acquisition of avoidance tendencies in the light of those
principles and discuss their potential clinical implications.
For illustration, we will describe the various phases of
avoidance learning by reference to a modified version of the
procedure used in the third experiment of Rescorla and LoLordo
(1965) that we have briefly described above (see the section on
safety signals). We use this experiment because it resembles a
typical active avoidance learning procedure while also illustrating
the potential inhibition of avoidance responses by safety stimuli.
In the experiment, dogs were placed in a large two-
compartment box, separated by a small barrier. The experimental
procedure included the presentation of a short tone (threat signal;
CS+) always followed by shock administration (US) and the
presentation of a long tone (safety signal; CS−) never followed by
shock administration. Dogs could avoid shock administration by
jumping across the barrier (i.e., the avoidance response) during
the presentation of the CS+. As described, such procedure would
typically lead to reliable execution of the avoidance response
during the CS+ and absence of such responses during the CS−.
We now turn to a step-by-step description of how those acquired
responses can be theoretically explained.
In line withmost of the theoretical accounts we have presented
above, we propose that avoidance learning involves a Pavlovian
component. Specifically, we assume that following a Pavlovian
conditioning procedure, the presentation of the CS+ will elicit
the expectancy of an aversive outcome, whereas the CS− will
elicit the expectancy of absence of the aversive outcome. As
a result of those expectancies, fear responses will be evoked
(e.g., physiological arousal, avoidance tendencies) in the presence
of the CS+, whereas responses of relief (e.g., physiological
relaxation, approach tendencies) are expressed in the presence of
the CS−.
In extension to the models we have presented above, we
maintain that the described Pavlovian component is sufficient
for evoking avoidance tendencies. As such, we essentially
treat avoidance tendencies as conditioned responses, similar to
physiological arousal or subjective apprehension, elicited by the
presentation of a threat cue. Such an explanation fits the data
of Krypotos et al. (2014b) where avoidance tendencies were
expressed in absence of any instrumental reinforcement. Going
back to our example, we propose that dogs will acquire a tendency
to exhibit avoidance in the presence of the CS+ sound prior to
any instrumental learning.
Although acquired, we propose that those avoidance
tendencies need not be translated into overt behavior (Strack
and Deutsch, 2004). At the same time, we argue that if expressed,
they will take the form of an SSDR (Bolles, 1970, 1971). In other
words, the dogs in our example are expected to start jumping
across the barrier upon presentation of the CS+, prior to the
operation of any instrumental processes. Such an idea might
explain the rapid learning of specific types of responses that serve
avoidance, relative to other responses (Bolles and Grossen, 1969).
In such cases, however, it would be more accurate to classify
those responses as escape responses, expressed in a reflex-like
manner, as their primary aim is to distance the organism from
the CS+ (i.e., CS escape).
Despite the rapid acquisition of SSDRs by mere Pavlovian
learning, the maintenance of those SSDRs, or the learning of
non-SSDRs, will in fact depend on instrumental learning. As
such, we adhere to the spirit of Mowrer’s two-factor theory
and more recent reformulations in assuming that avoidance
learning depends on both Pavlovian and instrumental processes.
Yet, we propose that instrumental learning plays a different
role depending on whether the to-be-learned avoidance response
belongs to an organism’s SSDR repertoire or not. Revisiting
our example, dogs are expected to start jumping across the
barrier upon presentation of the CS+, with such response being
maintained if the US stops being administrated (i.e., negative
reinforcement). If, however, such a response does not lead
to cancelation of the US, that particular avoidance response
will cease to be performed. For illustration, assume that the
experimenter-designated response changes from jumping (i.e., an
SSDR) to rearing (i.e., a non-SSDR). As jumping does not result
in omission of the US, another SSDR response will be performed
(e.g., running within the same compartment). However, since
that novel response is followed by US presentation as well, the
dog will cease that response too. Eventually, when all SSDRs have
been aborted, the dog may incidentally perform a non-SSDR (i.e.,
rearing). This response is then hypothesized to be maintained
through negative reinforcement by US omission. Although such
treatment of non-SSDRs bears similarities with Bolles’ (1971)
theory, in the sense that non-SSDRs are supposed to emerge
after SSDRs are no longer performed, it also deviates from SSDR
theory in that it accepts a role for reinforcement learning in the
maintenance of SSDRs and the learning of non-SSDRs.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 July 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 189
Krypotos et al. Avoidance learning
In contrast to existing models, we maintain that for the
instrumental component of avoidance learning, there are
multiple sources of reinforcement. Those sources include (1) the
non-occurrence of an expected aversive event after performance
of the avoidance response; (2) the reduction of fear due to escape
from the CS+, at least in the initial stages of reinforcement
learning; (3) the occurrence of discrete stimuli upon performance
of an avoidance response that become safety signals. Although
this is a bottom-up suggestion, we believe that by assuming
multiple sources of reinforcement, the described principles fit a
larger amount of data.
In line with both the cognitive and the expectancy model,
we propose that during instrumental learning, knowledge is
acquired that (1) the performance of an avoidance response in the
presence of the antecedent stimulus leads to the omission of the
otherwise expected aversive event and; (2) the non-performance
of an avoidance response in the presence of the antecedent
stimulus leads to the administration of the aversive event. Those
two theoretical accounts also assume that an individual or an
animal will prefer not encountering an aversive event (here a
shock) over encountering one.
Lastly, we take no position here in the debate as to whether
avoidance learning (and in particular the Pavlovian component
thereof) is based exclusively on propositional knowledge or also
relies on non-propositional association formation processes. The
recent literature provides strong evidence to support a single-
process propositional account of learning (see De Houwer, 2009;
Mitchell et al., 2009) as well as intriguing evidence to the contrary
(e.g., Sevenster et al., 2014).
Clinical Implications
The set of principles described above can help to detect sources of
maladaptive avoidance. By building on those principles, clinical
interventions for maladaptive avoidance can also be improved.
For instance, given that avoidance learning is assumed to
depend onmultiple pathways, the causes of maladaptive behavior
should not be assumed to be limited to direct experience with
threat. Maladaptive avoidance may just as well be the result
of instructions (e.g., kids being instructed to stay away from
dogs leading to a phobia toward dogs) or vicarious learning
(e.g., watching a plane crash on television as an onset of
avoidance of flying). Another potential pathway of avoidance
learning concerns symbolic generalization (e.g., avoidance of
thoughts of contamination that only symbolically relate to actual
contamination; Dymond et al., 2012).
Independent of the pathway, however, patients will often be
able to articulate purported relations between the antecedent
stimuli and the presentation or omission of an aversive outcome,
as well as the relationship between the cancelation of that
aversive outcome and the performance of an avoidance response
(Beck et al., 2005). Given that those relationships often reflect
misconceptions of the patient (e.g., that social interactions will
always end in embarrassment), those beliefs should be challenged
and modified during clinical interventions, a suggestion in line
with current cognitive-behavior therapy protocols.
In terms of interventions, a common therapeutic technique
for anxiety disorders and phobias is exposure therapy, which
entails confronting the individual repeatedly with the phobic
stimulus. Clinical results suggest that exposure is necessary, but
not sufficient, for the reduction of avoidance. A more effective
technique for diminishing avoidance is the combination of
exposure therapy with response prevention. This is consistent
with existing studies that show that in order to extinguish
an avoidance behavior it is not enough to omit the aversive
outcome after an antecedent stimulus, it is imperative that
subjects are meanwhile not allowed to perform the avoidance
response (see Solomon and Wynne, 1953; Brush, 1957; Seligman
and Campbell, 1965). This suggestion is based on experimental
findings showing that participants engaging in avoidance
and other safety-like behaviors during extinction will keep
avoiding the fear conditioned stimulus when avoidance is again
allowed (see the “protection-from-extinction” phenomenon; e.g.,
Lovibond et al., 2009). Similarly, in clinical cases, patients
with social phobia will often endure an exposure session by
performing subtle behaviors that reduce the level of experienced
fear (“within-situation safety”; Wells et al., 1996). Helpful as that
may be for enduring the phobic situation, it does not help in the
modification of the initial fear beliefs (Salkovskis et al., 1999).
Therefore, the combination of exposure therapy with response
prevention could lead to stronger symptom reduction, despite
causing sustained fear levels during exposure (Abramowitz, 1996;
Neziroglu et al., 2011). In that direction, and in line with the
expectancy model, a change in irrational beliefs of the clients, as
typically done in cognitive-behavior therapies, could also prove
potentially helpful (Whittal et al., 2005).
Finally, we have shown that avoidance tendencies can
be established by mere Pavlovian association, without any
instrumental reinforcement. Those tendencies are prone to
return after Pavlovian extinction (Krypotos et al., 2014b). Given
that such avoidance tendencies may act as precursors of overt
avoidance, it might be helpful if therapeutic protocols also
target the modification of action tendencies in addition to
overt behavior. Encouraging results in that direction come from
experimental studies on the modification of action tendencies
using approach-avoidance training tasks (training AATs; see
Wiers et al., 2010; Wittekind et al., 2015). In those tasks,
participants have to primarily approach one type of stimulus
and avoid another type of stimulus by using a joystick or
keyboard buttons. Following such procedures, participants
typically exhibit stronger approach tendencies toward the former
type of stimuli and stronger avoidance tendencies toward the
latter type of stimuli than before. Training AATs seem to
influence corresponding overt behavior as well, at least in non-
clinical populations (Taylor and Amir, 2012; Amir et al., 2013).
However, translation of those findings to clinical populations has
proven unsuccessful so far (e.g., Asnaani et al., 2014; Krypotos
et al., in press; van Uijen et al., 2015). More research is clearly
warranted here.
Current Challenges and Future Directions
The renewed interest in avoidance learning is apparent
not only in experimental psychology research, but also in
clinical psychology, psychiatry, and behavioral neuroscience
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(see above). With the increased interest in avoidance learning
in clinical science and behavioral neuroscience come new
challenges, such as a need for better communication between
basic researchers and clinicians and integration of insights
from neuroscience in psychological theories of avoidance
learning.
Enhancing the Communication between Basic
Scientists and Clinicians
A first step for enhancing communication between basic
scientists and clinicians (clinical psychologists and psychiatrists)
is convergence on a common language. As an illustration of
the discrepancy between the experimental and clinical use of
similar terms we refer to the definition of active avoidance
as used in DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
There it is stated that “Active avoidance means the individual
intentionally behaves in ways that are designed to prevent or
minimize contact with phobic objects or situations (e.g., takes
tunnels instead of bridges on daily commute to work for fear of
heights; avoids entering a dark room for fear of spiders; avoids
accepting a job in a locale where a phobic stimulus is more
common).” This definition does not distinguish between active
and passive avoidance or between escape and avoidance; yet those
behaviors might reflect the operation of distinct psychological
mechanisms (see above). We believe that a common definition
of different expressions of avoidance and the conditions
under which it occurs, may enable clearer communication
between experimental and clinical science and enhance the
translation of experimental findings to clinical interventions and
back.
Throughout our review, we have attempted to translate
basic experimental findings to clinical situations. It is equally
important that clinical observations feed into basic research. A
good example for that is a recent study in which avoidance
behavior led to US cancelation on some, rather than all, trials.
This experimental protocol may map better on real life situations
where avoidance is not always successful in preventing the
occurrence of an unpleasant event (Vervliet, 2014). This should
therefore provide better ecological validity to experimental
findings (Vervliet and Raes, 2013).
The avoidance learning procedures we have described so
far mainly focus on how someone learns to avoid an expected
aversive event. This is, however, quite different from what is
mostly of interest in clinical practice. Take for example someone
with symptoms of spider phobia. In that case, the spider could
serve as the antecedent stimulus of the aversive event, such as
a venomous bite. In experimental settings, that would entail
that the individual would escape the spider and avoid the bite.
However, it is quite common for an individual to try and avoid
the spider altogether, for example by keeping away from places
where spiders are commonly found (e.g., forests). Therefore,
experimental studies should develop protocols in which it is
possible for someone to avoid the antecedent stimulus rather
than the aversive event. Procedures that include sequential CSs
(e.g., CS1 → CS2 → US relationships) could prove useful
in this regard (e.g., Levis and Boyd, 1979; Malloy and Levis,
1988).
Future Developments
The theories of avoidance learning reviewed above are utterly
silent with regard to the role of individual differences factors.
Likewise, most experimental studies focus on how avoidance
responses are acquired in general, without attending to
differences between participants. However, investigating how
individual differences in trait characteristics or biological factors
(e.g., sex hormones) affect avoidance learning could be important
for theoretical and clinical reasons.
Theoretically, the consideration of differences in biological
factors or trait characteristics may help in predicting distinct
avoidance learning patterns. With respect to biological factors,
for example, animal research has demonstrated sex and strain
differences in the rate at which avoidance is acquired (Avcu
et al., 2014) and extinguished (Jiao et al., 2011). Sex differences
have also been documented in humans (e.g., in Sheynin et al.,
2014). Regarding trait characteristics, Lommen et al. (2010)
have shown that individuals with high levels of neuroticism
tend to show higher levels of avoidance toward ambiguous
stimuli than individuals with low levels of neuroticism. Of
importance, differences in the rate of avoidance learning might
be associated with differences in other learning processes. For
example, behaviorally inhibited individuals exhibit stronger
conditionability between a CS and a US compared to non-
inhibited individuals (Allen et al., 2014).
Clinically, the investigation of individual differences could
inform the development of treatments that are tailored to specific
disorders. Indeed, it has been suggested that avoidance learning
patterns may differ across mental disorders (Mosig et al., 2014).
Support for this suggestion comes from findings demonstrating
differences in conditionability (i.e., the tendency to “acquire a
larger and more persistent (autonomic) differential response to
an aversive CS”; Wegerer et al., 2013) between individuals with
low and high levels of spider phobia (Mosig et al., 2014). It
may be hypothesized that those differences could also generalize
to distinct avoidance learning patterns that differ across mental
disorders. Future studies might try to unravel whether distinct
patterns of avoidance constitute prognostic factors for specific
disorders, allowing more targeted interventions.
Another avenue for research might be the investigation of
how avoidance responding turns from goal-directed to habitual
(Dickinson, 1980; Wood and Neal, 2007). If we assume that
persistent maladaptive avoidance behavior (e.g., in anxiety
disorders) is often instrumentally reinforced, the principles
described above imply that avoidance is performed in a goal-
directed manner. In other words, it is assumed that avoidance
is based on knowledge about the consequences of each action
and the desirability of each outcome event. However, especially
in the area of psychopathology, behavior is often performed
in a habitual manner, that is in a more automatic/reflexive
way than goal-directed actions. Specifically, in cases such as
that of anxiety disorders, maladaptive avoidance is performed
repetitively, over long period of times. Such overtraining of
maladaptive avoidance might result in that behavior taking the
form of a habit, performed in an automatic—opposed to goal-
directed—manner (Wood and Neal, 2007). This distinction is
important as habitual responses have been shown to be less
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sensitive to extinction (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). As such,
it would be worthwhile both experimentally and clinically to
address the factors that turn a goal-directed avoidance action
into a habit. In that direction, Ilango et al. (2014) proposed
that in cases of habitual avoidance in rats, active avoidance
recruits and depends on the same neural structures also involved
in habit formation (e.g., the striatal-nigral-striatal circuitry),
suggesting that this region should be targeted in the investigation
of persistent avoidance.
Another potential source of novel insight are recent
computational models of avoidance learning. One such model
is the actor-critic model of Maia (2010) that is strongly
inspired by the two-factor theory of Mowrer but also takes
the role of prediction error in learning into account. Myers
et al. (2014) also recently presented a reinforcement learning
computational model that could successfully predict the
acquisition of avoidance behavior in Sprague-Dawley and
Wistar-Kyoto rats. Lastly, we have provided a Bayesian drift-
diffusion model decomposition of performance in AAT tasks
(Krypotos et al., 2014a). Such models often allow a more
accurate assessment of performance and a more precise
investigation of the psychological mechanisms involved in
avoidance learning/performance. Of importance, knowledge of
the cognitive mechanisms in play during maladaptive behavior
expression could serve the development of more targeted clinical
interventions (Kazdin, 2008).
Over the past decade, behavioral neuroscience research
has greatly expanded our insight into the neural correlates
of avoidance learning. It has been shown, for example, that
avoidance learning in humans correlates with activation of
amygdala, which is known to play a key role in the acquisition
of Pavlovian fear responses (Phelps and LeDoux, 2005), and the
striatum (O’Doherty, 2004), which is involved in learning about
rewards (Delgado et al., 2009). In rodent studies, areas such as the
amygdala (Cain and LeDoux, 2008), the infralimbic prefrontal
cortex (Moscarello and LeDoux, 2013), and the prefrontal striatal
circuits (Bravo-Rivera et al., 2014; see also Phelps and LeDoux,
2005; Ilango et al., 2014 for reviews) have also been shown to
play a role in avoidance acquisition. Findings such as these help
to further increase our understanding of how Pavlovian and
instrumental learning processes shape avoidance behavior.
Exciting possibilities for the deeper investigation of the
neural correlates in avoidance acquisition open up with the
introduction of new methodologies. For example, in order to
mimic the behavior of natural predators, Choi and Kim (2010)
used the Robogator (LEGO Mindstorms robot) while rats where
approaching or avoiding food stimuli. The results showed that
rats’ foreaging behavior increased during amygdala inactivation
and decreased during amygdala activation. Also, Bravo-Rivera
et al. (2014) attempted to dissociate the neural circuits mediating
active avoidance in rats. Importantly, researchers argued against
the use of the traditional shuttlebox, where both compartments
can predict shock making it difficult to differentiate between
circuits involved in active avoidance and escape. Instead, they
used a new paradigm where a US could be avoided if animals
would step on a nearby platform that had never been shocked
before. The results showed that active avoidance is mediated by
the prefrontal-striatal circuit. Further neurobiological dissection
of the differences between passive avoidance, active avoidance,
and escape is likely to necessitate updating of psychological
theories of avoidance learning, which typically assume that they
rely on similar processes. In that respect, exciting possibilities
for studying the neural circuits of avoidance acquisition open up
with the use of optogenetics (see Kravitz et al., 2012; Nabavi et al.,
2014; Namburi et al., 2015 for recent examples).
Conclusions
Research on avoidance learning had waned since the 1970s,
leaving key questions unanswered. In light of the recent renewal
of interest in avoidance in behavioral and brain research and
in clinical science, we have provided a review of the most
prominent historical and modern avoidance learning theories
and relevant empirical findings. This review has yielded a number
of essential principles of avoidance learning that should be useful
for experimental researchers as well as clinicians.
Many questions remain to be answered. We have highlighted
topics for future research as well as ways to enhance
communication between basic and clinical science. By doing so,
we hope that the present paper contributes to further research on
the psychological and biological basis of avoidance and helps to
pave the way for novel interventions.
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